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FAMILY LAW-A Limitation on Grandparental Rights in
New Mexico: Christian Placement Service v. Gordon
I. INTRODUCTION
In Christian Placement Service, New Mexico Christian Children's Home
v. Gordon,' the New Mexico Court of Appeals determined whether a
grandparent's statutorily-created right to seek visitation with a grandchild
is sufficient to support a motion to intervene of right in an adoption
proceeding, and, alternatively, whether a grandparent's interest in the
child's well-being will support a motion for permissive intervention in
such a proceeding. The Christian Placement Service court held that a
grandparent has no inherent or statutory right to intervene in an adoption
proceeding2 and, moreover, that under the Visitation by Grandparents
Act, a grandparent's right to petition for visitation terminates when the
parents relinquish their parental rights.3 Furthermore, the court of appeals
found that grandparental status alone will not support permissive inter-
vention.'
This Note examines the interaction between the Visitation by Grand-
parents Act,5 the Adoption Act,6 and the common law doctrines of the
best interests of the child and parental rights7 which impact on grand-
1. 102 N.M. 465, 697 P.2d 148 (Ct. App. 1985).
2. Id.
3. Id. at 467, 697 P.2d at 150. Neither the Adoption Act, N.M. Stat. Ann. §§40-7-1 to -13
(1978), nor the Visitation by Grandparents Act N.M. Stat. Ann §§40-9-1 to -4 (1978), gives
grandparents a statutory right to custody of their grandchildren over third parties. See also Ex parte
Bronstein, 434 So. 2d 780 (Ala. 1983), wherein the court stated:
The law is unequivocal. It mandates that upon entry of a final order of adoption
the natural parent is "divested of all legal rights and obligations" and the child is
freed from all corresponding obligations of obedience to such parent. . . .[I]n all
logic, this abrogation of all legal relationships and rights would likewise apply to
the [natural] grandparents of the adopted child.
Id. at 782
See also In re Nicholas, 457 A.2d 1359, 1360 (R.I. 1983) ("[T]he decision of the natural father
not to contest the adoption petition was conclusive upon him and upon all who might claim by,
through, or under him.") The Christian Placement Service court concluded that grandparents are
bound by the effective consent of the parents or surviving parent to the child's adoption. 102 N.M.
at 470, 697 P.2d at 153.
4. 102 N.M. at 471, 697 P.2d at 154.
5. N.M. Stat. Ann. §§40-9-1 to -4 (1978).
6. N.M. Stat. Ann. §§40-7-1 to -11, 40-7-13 to -17 (1978) (repealed 1985) (current version at
N.M. Stat. Ann §§40-7-29 to -61).
7. The parental rights doctrine and the best interests of the child doctrine serve as broad policy
statements to guide trial judges in exercising their unquestionably broad discretion in deciding custody
disputes. Shorty v. Scott, 87 N.M. 490, 535 P.2d 1341 (1975). See infra note 34.
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parents' right to intervene. This Note also analyzes the New Mexico Court
of Appeals' reasoning in denying grandparental intervention in this case
and considers the implications of the court of appeals' decision for grand-
parent's rights in New Mexico.
II. STATEMENT OF THE CASE
John Doe was born June 14, 1982 to unmarried parents.8 Seven days
later, the natural mother relinquished her parental rights to the Christian
Placement Service of the New Mexico Christian Children's Home ("the
Home") and consented to his adoption. 9 Meanwhile, the father received
a military transfer to England.' ° On August 26, 1983, upon the Home's
petition and without notice to the father or his consent, the court entered
a decree terminating the father's parental rights and placing the child with
the Home." On September 4, 1983, the father died and his mother,
Delores Wiley, was named personal representative of his estate.' 2 In
November, John Doe's foster parents filed a petition to adopt him. Wiley,
the child's paternal grandmother, moved to intervene in the adoption
proceeding and to set aside the decree terminating her son's parental
rights. 1
3
Under the New Mexico Rules of Civil Procedure, Wiley could intervene
in one of two ways. First, Wiley could intervene of right upon a showing
that she had an interest in the action which was not protected. 4 Alter-
natively, Wiley could seek the court's permission to intervene.' 5
Wiley based her motion to intervene of right on three grounds. First,
as the grandmother, Wiley alleged the decree terminating her son's pa-
8. 102 N.M. at 467, 697 P.2d at 150.
9. Id.
10. Id. Both of John Doe's parents were stationed at Cannon Air Force Base in Clovis, New
Mexico when he was conceived.
11. Id. Presumably, the father's parental rights were terminated pursuant to the New Mexico
Adoption Act. N.M. Stat. Ann. §§ 40-7-4 (1978)(repealed 1985) (current version at N.M. Stat. Ann.
§ 40-7-36); termination of parental rights N.M. Stat. Ann. § 32-1-54 (Repl. Pamp. 1986). See infra
note 30.
12. 102 N.M. at 467-68, 697 P.2d at 150-51.
13. Id. at 468, 697 P.2d at 151. Since Wiley was not a party to the adoption proceedings, she
had to show that her intervention was justified.
14. A party may seek intervention of right pursuant to Rule 24(a) N.M. R. Civ. P. 24(b) provides
for permissive intervention t the court's discretion, of the New Mexico Rules of Civil Procedure
which provides:
Upon timely application anyone may be permitted to intervene in an action:
(1) when a confers an unconditional right to intervene; or (2) when the applicant
claims an interest relating to the property or transaction which is the subject of
the action and he is so situated that the disposition of the action may as a practical
matter impair or impede his ability to protect that interest.
N.M. R. Civ.P. 24(a).
15. N.M. R. Civ. P. 24(b) provides for permissive intervention at the court's discretion.
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rental rights was defective and, consequently, her right to petition for
visitation with her grandson was wrongfully terminated.' 6 Second, she
argued that the termination decree was void and as personal representative
of her son's estate she was entitled to move the court to set aside this
void judgment.' 7 Both of these arguments assume as the underlying prem-
ise that if Wiley's son's parental rights had not been terminated, Wiley
would have statutorily guaranteed grounds for intervention pursuant to
the Visitation by Grandparents Act.'8 Therefore, for Wiley to assert a
statutory right to intervene in the adoption proceeding, Wiley had to
attack the validity of the termination decree. Third, Wiley argued that,
even if the termination of parental rights was valid, the vitality of her
rights conferred by the Visitation by Grandparents Act continued until a
final adoption decree was entered.' 9 Alternatively, Wiley moved for per-
missive intervention claiming that the best interests of her grandson re-
quired that she, as grandparent, be permitted to intervene.2" The New
Mexico Court of Appeals, affirming the trial court, denied Wiley's mo-
tions on procedural and substantive grounds.2' Addressing Wiley's mo-
tions to intervene of right the court held, first, that Wiley had no standing
to attack the allegedly defective decree which terminated her son's pa-
rental rights and added that the decree was irrelevant to Wiley's right as
grandmother to intervene.22 Moreover, the court found that the issue of
whether or not the termination decree was defective was mooted upon
Wiley's son's death.23 Second, the court determined that Wiley, as per-
sonal representative of her son's estate, had no standing to intervene,
reasoning that no estate interest existed in the adoption proceeding.24
Third, the court held that the Visitation by Grandparents Act does not
confer a right upon a grandparent to intervene after parental rights are
terminated and before adoption occurs.2 As to Wiley's motion for per-
missive intervention, the court concluded that grandparental status cannot
16. 102 N.M. at 469-70, 690 P.2d at 151-52.
17. Id.
18. See infra note 28.
19. 102 N.M. at 470, 697 P.2d at 153.
20. Id. at 472, 697 P.2d at 155.
21. Id. at 467, 697 P.2d 150.
22. Id. at 469, 697 P.2d at 151. Wiley's first ground for intervention rested on the allegedly
defective termination of her son's parental rights. Wiley recognized that as a grandparent she had
no right to notice or to an opportunity to be heard. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 40-9-4 clearly prohibits her
intervention in the adoption proceeding of her grandson when parental rights are terminated and
adoption proceedings are pending.
23. 102 N.M. at 471, 697 P.2d at 154.
24. Id. Wiley challenged the decree, arguing that no notice was given to her son that his parental
rights were being terminated. The court held that service of process defects are personal to the one
entitled to notice. Thus, Wiley had no standing to raise the notice and constitutionality issues.
25. Id. at 470, 697 P.2d at 153.
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be the sole foundation for invoking permissive intervention under the
"best interests of the child" doctrine.26
III. DISCUSSION AND ANALYSIS
In order to better understand the New Mexico Court of Appeal's denial
of intervention in this case, this Note will analyze the relationship between
the statutory and common law doctrines which constrained the court and
examine the court's interpretation of these doctrines and the ramifications
of its interpretation for grandparental rights in New Mexico.
A. Assessment of Law Interpreted by the New Mexico Court of Appeals
in Christian Placement Service
Wiley argued that she had a right to intervene arising from the grand-
parental interest in visitation created by the Visitation by Grandparents
Act.27 Section 40-9-2 of the Visitation by Grandparents Act provides that
when a "minor child is in the custody of any person other than an adoptive
parent," the grandparent can petition for visitation privileges. 8 Section
4, however, provides that a grandparent's right ends when the parents'
rights are terminated pursuant to statutory adoption proceedings.29 Thus,
26. Id. at 472-73, 697 P.2d at 155-56.
27. Id. at 472, 697 P.2d at 155.
28. The Visitation by Grandparents Act provides:
40-9-1. Dissolution of marriage or legal separation, judgment visitation privi-
leges.
In rendering a judgment of dissolution of marriage or legal separation, or at
any time after six months from entry of such decree, the district court may grant
reasonable visitation privileges to a grandparent of a minor child, not in conflict
with the child's education or prior established visitation privileges.
40-9-2. Children; visitation by grandparents.
If one or both parents of a minor child is deceased and the minor is in the
custody of a surviving parent or any other person other than an adoptive parent,
any grandparent of the minor may petition the district court for visitation privileges
with respect to the minor.
40-9-3. Visitation; restrictions.
A. Under either Section 1 or 2 [40-9-1 or 40-9-2 NMSA 1978] of this act, the
court may grant reasonable visitation privileges to a grandparent if the court
determines that it is in the best interests and welfare of the child, and may issue
any necessary order to enforce the visitation privileges to a grandparent if the
court determines that it is in the best interests and welfare of the child, and may
issue any necessary order to enforce the visitation privileges and may modify
such privileges or order upon a showing of good cause by any interested per-
son ....
40-9-4. Applicability.
The act [40-9-1 to 40-9-4 NMSA 1978] shall have no application in the event
of a relinquishment or termination of parental rights in cases of statutory adoption
proceedings.
29. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 40-9-4 (1978).
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the court had to determine whether a grandparent's statutorily-created
right to seek visitation with a grandchild ceases to exist when the parental
rights are terminated but the child is in the custody of someone other
than the adoptive parent.
The court of appeals decided that, in adopting Section 4 of the Visitation
by Grandparents Act, the legislature intended to maintain the Adoption
Act's supremacy in controlling the disposition of children notwithstanding
the statutorily created right to grandparent visitation.3" The court reasoned
that grandparental rights stem from the relationship between the grand-
parent and the child's parent, and adoption proceedings terminate the
rights of the natural parent to the child.31 Thus, without the natural parent's
link to the child, the law does not recognize a link between the grandparent
30. N.M. Stat. Ann. §§ 40-7-1 to -21 created adoption which was unknown at the common law.
The Adoption Act provides in pertinent part:
40-7-2
I. "parental rights" means all rights of a parent with reference to a minor,
including parental right to control, or to withhold consent to an adoption, or to
receive notice of a hearing on a petition for adoption.
40-7-4
A. The rights of a parent . . . may be terminated by the court. . . . [Tihe court
shall give primary consideration to the physical, mental and emotional welfare
and needs of the child.
B. The court shall terminate parental fights . . . to a minor child when:
(1) the minor has been abandoned;
(2) the minor has been left under such circumstances that the identity of
the parents is unknown ... ,
(3) the child is a neglected or abused child; or
(4) the child has been placed in foster care . . .
M. A judgment of the court terminating parental rights divests the parent and
the child of all legal rights, privileges, duties and obligations
40-7-6
A. Unless consent is not required because of the provisions of the Adoption
Act . . . . a petition to adopt a minor child may be granted only if written consent
to the adoption has been executed by:
(1) the mother of the minor; [or]
(2) the father of the minor, if the minor was conceived or born while the
father was married to the mother, if the minor is his child by adoption, or
if the minor has been established to be his child ...
40-7-7
A consent to adoption . . . is not required from:
A. a parent who has abandoned or deserted the minor to be adopted;
B. a parent of a minor in the custody of an agency, the department or a person
not the minor's parent, if the parent:
(1) for a period of at least one year has failed without justifiable cause to
communicate with the minor.
Adoption law embodies in statutory form the public policy toward disposition of children who
have no parents. In Nevelos v. Railston, the court found proper construction of New Mexico adoption
statutes will promote the welfare of children. 65 N.M. 250, 335 P.2d 573 (1959).
31. See In re Nicholas, 457 A.2d 1359 (R.I. 1983).
FAMILY LAWWinter 19871
NEW MEXICO LAW REVIEW
and the child.32 Therefore, Wiley's right to petition for visitation existed
until the mother terminated her parental rights regardless of whether her
deceased son's parental rights were terminated.33
In addition to statutory adoption law, New Mexico courts recognize
two controlling common law doctrines in adoption proceedings, the "pa-
rental rights" doctrine and the "best interests of the child" doctrine.34
The "parental rights" doctrine "creates a presumption that the welfare
and best interests of the minor child will best be served in the custody
of the natural parents." 35 If the parent relinquishes the child, the parent
is presumed to have acted in the child's best interests. The parental rights
doctrine controls cases between the parents and grandparents while pa-
32. In re Interest of S.R., 217 Neb. 528, 352 N.W.2d 141 (1984) held that the best interests of
the child are served by breaking all ties with the natural family and finding an adoptive family where
the child begins anew without any former ties, including grandparents.
33. 102 N.M. at 469, 697 P.2d at 153. Since the father had died, he had no parental rights upon
which Wiley's right as grandparent could rest. Despite his death, her connection to her grandson
would have remained viable except the mother's parental rights had been terminated.
34. State ex rel Dept. of Human Serv. v. Natural Mother, 96 N.M. 677, 634 P.2d 699 (Ct. App.
1981). In Natural Mother, the court of appeals acknowledged that, in custody cases, it must consider
the best interests of the child but not to the exclusion of the rights of parents to raise their children.
Id. at 681, 634 P.2d at 703. The doctrines serve as broad policy statements to guide trial judges in
exercising their unquestionably broad discretion in deciding custody disputes. Shorty, 87 N.M. at
492, 535 P.2d at 1343.
Under the parental rights doctrine, parents have a primary right to custody of their children, with
a rebuttable presumption that in the parent's care the best interests of the child will be protected.
Id. at 493, 535 P.2d at 1344. The parental rights doctrine establishes that parents have a natural and
legal right to their children which is prima facie and not absolute. Id.
The right stems from the duties and obligations embodied in parenting. Courts reason that if
parents are responsible for children, certain rights must follow from that responsibility. See, e.g.,
O'Dell v. Lutz, 177 P.2d 628 (Cal. 1947).
When utilizing the best interests of the child doctrine, the court determines, on the basis of the
facts presented, what will be in the best interests of the child. Adoption of Doe, 89 N.M. 606, 615,
555 P.2d 906, 915 (1976).
Although Christian Placement Service is not a custody dispute per se, the adoption proceeding
is analogous in that it seeks an appropriate disposition for the child. In Shorty, the court recognized
that New Mexico cases fail to maintain a clear distinction between the two doctrines. 87 N.M. at
492, 535 P.2d at 1343.
In this case, one parent had died and thus had no parental rights and the surviving parent had
relinquished her rights. Under the reasoning in Shorty, the best interests of the child doctrine should
have prevailed. In Christian Placement Service, however, even though the child's parents' rights
were terminated, the presumptions embodied in the parental rights doctrine prevailed. That is, rather
than examining the child's best interests, the court presumed that the mother acted in the child's
best interests when she relinquished him to the Home. If the best interests of the child become
paramount when the child's parents are no longer involved in the proceeding, then the court could
determine that the involvement of concerned grandparents in this traumatic time of the child's life
would foster the maintenance of the child's best interests. See supra notes 43, 71.
35. Exparte Bronstein, 434 So.2d 780 (Ala. 1983). Under common law principles grandparents
lacked any legal right to visitation and commmunication with their grandchildren if such visitation
was forbidden by the parents. Id. The court in Bronstein enunciated two policies precluding courts
from granting visitation rights to grandparents in adoption proceedings: 1) grandparent visitation,
when against the wishes of adoptive parents, is never in the best interests of the child, and 2)
grandparent visitation rights are derivative of the biological parents' rights; therefore, when parental
rights are terminated, grandparental rights are also terminated. Id.
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rental rights are still intact.36 Once the parent's rights are terminated or
challenged, however, the "best interests of the child" doctrine controls
the child's placement.37 The "best interests of the child doctrine" compels
courts to ascertain what will be in the child's best interests in determining
the child's placement.38
B. New Mexico Court of Appeals Analysis in Christian Placement
Service
1. Intervention of Right
Wiley, as grandparent, had statutorily guaranteed grounds for inter-
vention pursuant to the Visitation by Grandparents Act as long as her son
maintained his parental rights." Therefore, in order to support a motion
to intervene of right, Wiley had to show that the decree terminating her
son's parental rights was defective or otherwise invalid.'
The first argument advanced for intervention of right was premised on
the theory that Wiley, as grandparent, had a right to collaterally attack
the decree terminating her child's parental rights. 4 Because there is no
New Mexico case law regarding a grandparent's standing to intervene in
proceedings which terminate a child's parental rights, the court looked
to reasoning in case law from other jurisdictions to determine whether a
grandparent has standing to collaterally attack a termination decree.42
Absent special circumstances, courts of other jurisdictions hold that
grandparents have no right to participate in proceedings, such as the
termination of parental rights, which lead to the adoption of their grand-
children.43 In New Mexico, the Visitation by Grandparents Act specifies
that a grandparent's right to petition for visitation ends when the parental
rights of the child's parents are terminated. 44
36. Shorty, 87 N.M. at 493, 535 P.2d at 134.
37. In Barwin v. Reidy, 62 N.M. 183, 307 P.2d 175 (1957) the court indicated that when parents
have relinquished their parental rights, the court must determine what is in the best interests of the
child. Under this doctrine, known as parens patrie, the courts are presumed to do what is best for
the child. Id. at 191, 307 P.2d at 183.
38. Shorty, 87 N.M. at 490, 535 P.2d at 1341. When the child's best interests are assumed to
be protected they are not examined.
39. 102 N.M. at 467, 697 P.2d at 150; See supra text accompanying notes 31-33.
40. Id. See N.M. Stat. Ann. § 40-9-4. See also supra note 14.
41. Id. at 467, 697 P2d at 150.
42. See supra notes 3 and 33.
43. When a grandparent stands in the role of parent to her grandchild, otherwise known as in
loco parentis, the courts have held the grandparent has the same rights to the grandchild that the
child's parents would have. See, e.g., Quarles v. French, 611 S.W. 2d 757 (Ark. 1981). This
situation compels the court to view grandparent intervention as being in the best interests of the
child. Since Wiley lacked custody and had no actual relationship with her grandson, she did not
meet the exception; therefore, the court refused to permit her to intervene.
44. N.M. Stat. Ann. §40-9-4 (1978). Implicitly, the court reasoned that it did not have the
freedom to make or modify law clearly mandated by the legislature. Only the legislature can provide
grandparents with a non-derivative right to intervene in adoption proceedings. See supra note 3.
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In this case, John Doe's mother voluntarily relinquished her parental
rights seven days after his birth.45 More than a year later, the court entered
an order terminating the father's parental rights.' Consequently, Wiley's
statutory right to petition for visitation ended.47
The second ground for intervention was that, as personal representative
of her son's estate, Wiley had a right to move the court to set aside a
void judgment.4" The court, however, held that there is no estate interest
in the termination of the deceased person's parental rights.49 Accordingly,
Wiley, as personal representative, had no standing to attack the allegedly
defective termination decree.5
Compelling public policy prevented the court from finding an estate
interest which would permit attack on a decree terminating the deceased
parent's parental rights.5 The court recognized that parents have a natural
and legal right to raise their own children; however, the estate of a
deceased parent, as an abstract entity, cannot raise children. 2
In denying that a personal representative could intervene, the court
reasoned that the living parent must be allowed to make determinations
regarding the child.53 Furthermore, allowing a personal representative to
set aside a void judgment affecting a child's placement directly conflicts
with the public policy of facilitating swift and permanent placement of
the child.54 In this case, John Doe had been in a foster home for an
extended period of time, a situation not favored by the courts or the
45. 102 N.M. at 467, 697 P.2d at 150.
46. Id. at 470, 697 P.2d at 153.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 469, 697 P.2d at 152. New Mexico Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)(4) allows the court
to relieve a party "or his legal representative" from a void judgment. N.M. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(4).
49. 102 N.M. at 469, 697 P.2d at 152. See supra note 24 and infra note 50.
50. Id. Wiley argued that if notice was not required to be given to her son under § 40-7-6(A)(2)
of the Adoption Act, the failure to require that notice be given rendered that section of the Adoption
Act unconstitutional. Under the Adoption Act, Wiley's son's consent was not needed for the adoption
since he did not fit the statutorily created category of fathers from whom consent is required: if the
person is the father of the minor, if the minor was conceived or born while the father was married
to the mother, if the minor is his child by adoption, or if the minor has been established to be his
child by his acknowledgment or a court proceeding. Wiley's son was not married to his son's mother
and had not been acknowledged by the court as the father. The Christian Placement Service court
found persuasive authority that grandparents are bound by the effective consent to adoption of the
surviving parent who, in this case, is the mother of John Doe. See supra note 3. Furthermore, the
court of appeals refused to decide the constitutionality of § 40-7-6(A)(2) of the Adoption Act because
Wiley's son's death precluded him from challenging it, and, as the affected party, he alone had the
right to challenge the law.
51. 102 N.M. at 469, 690 P.2d at 152. An estate's interest could arise years after a decree
terminating the deceased parent's rights was erroneously entered. Allowing an estate to intervene
could potentially prolong uncertainty rather than facilitate a child's permanent placement. See infra
note 62 and note 71.
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. Id. See infra note 69.
[Vol. 17
FAMILY LAW
legislature.55 The Christian Placement Service court found that it was
contrary to the child's best interests to allow a personal representative of
a deceased parent's estate to impede an appropriate permanent placement
for the child.56
Wiley asserted as her third ground for intervention that, even if the
termination of parental rights was valid, the Visitation by Grandparents
Act allowed her to seek visitation privileges with her grandson until the
final adoption decree was entered and such privileges did not terminate
upon the day consent for the adoption was given.57 Implicitly, she urged
the court to interpret the Visitation by Grandparents Act to encourage,
allow, or require grandparent intervention in proceedings related to cus-
tody of grandchildren before adoption orders are entered." 8 Wiley argued
that such an interpretation would be consistent with the legislature's
recognition of the value of the grandparent-grandchild relationship em-
bodied in the Visitation by Grandparents Act."
The court denied Wiley's interpretation of the Visitation by Grand-
parents Act, reasoning that such an interpretation conflicted with the
Adoption Act. The court, therefore, held that Wiley's right to petition
terminated when the child's mother relinquished her parental rights and
did not extend until the child's legal adoption.6 The court's rationale
stems from the court's acceptance that, as an offset to the responsibilities
of parenting, parents have the right to make decisions affecting their
children, including adoption, without interference from relatives. 6 Rec-
ognizing a right in relatives to intervene, it is argued, would hinder
proceedings designed to place the child in an adoptive home.6"
55. See 102 N.M. at 465, 690 P.2d at 148; Adoption of Doe, 98 N.M. 340, 648 P.2d 798 (Ct.
App. 1982), wherein the court found that providing a means for termination of parental rights to
free children legally for adoption, § 40-7-4(B)(4) constitutes legislative recognition that extended
long term foster care of children is not in their best interest; Adoption Act, see supra note 30.
56. Id. at 469, 697 P.2d at 152. See supra notes 48 and 51.
57. Id. at 470, 697 P.2d at 153. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 40-9-2 allows grandparents to seek visitation
if the grandchild is in the custody of one other than the adoptive parent. The Home had legal custody
of Wiley's grandson.
58. Id. at 469, 697 P.2d at 152.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 470, 697 P.2d at 153.
61. See Krieg v. Glassburn, 419 N.E.2d 1013 (Ind. App. 1981); Benavidez v. Oliva, 52 111. App.
3d 626, 10 I11. Dec. 362, 367 N.E.2d 971 (1977); Adoption of Doe, 89 N.M. 606, 555 P.2d 906
(Ct. App. 1976); Roberts v. Staples, 79 N.M. 298, 535 P.2d 1341 (1968); Wilson v. Family Services
Division, 554 P.2d 227 (Utah 1976), aft'd, 572 P.2d 682. See also Huey v. Lente, wherein the
court held that the sole consideration applied in termination proceedings was the relationship of a
parent with respect to a minor. 85 N.M. 585, 595, 514 P.2d 1081, 1091 (Ct. App. 1973) (Hernandez,
specially concurring opinion), rev'd., 85 N.M. 597, 514 P.2d 1093 (1973).
62. Wilson v. Family Serv. Div., 554 P.2d 227 (Utah 1976). The Wilson court added that the
problem is where to draw the line between the potential number of protesters to a child's adoption.
The Wilson court found that allowing relatives to intervene is fraught with trouble, makes placement
of children more difficult for social agencies, and is to be avoided. The court in Benavidez noted
Winter 1987]
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2. Permissive Intervention
Wiley also moved for permissive intervention, arguing that the best
interests of the grandchild required that Wiley be permitted to intervene.63
Wiley asserted that she could provide the best home for the child. 4 The
Christian Placement Service court, however, decided that Wiley was
relying solely upon her grandparent status to support her "best interests
of the child" argument, and the court held that grandparental status cannot
be the sole foundation for invoking permissive intervention. 65 Thus, by
denying Wiley's motion to intervene, the Christian Placement Service
Court upheld the policy underlying the parental rights doctrine that the
mother acted in the child's best interest when she consented to his adop-
66tion.
C. Implications for the Future of Grandparental Rights
The court's refusal to recognize a relative's right to intervene presents
a dilemma for relatives like Wiley, who believe that the best interests of
the child justify their intervention. As a general rule, courts emphasize
the parents' right to make decisions regarding their children including the
right to give up the child for adoption. 67 Accordingly, once parental rights
are terminated, relatives have no rights to these children against strangers."6
Underlying this approach is the policy that refusing to permit relatives
to intervene facilitates placement of children and economizes scarce ju-
dicial resources.69
On the other hand, there are equally compelling arguments favoring
intervention which emphasize society's high valuation of preserving fam-
ily relationships.70 Changes in society's public policy toward adoption
"a grave matter of public policy [is] implicit in the contention of the grandparents that they have a
right to intervene because they are the grandparents and are the preferred parties in an adoption
case." 52 111. App. 3d at 629, 10 111. Dec. at 365, 367 N.E.2d at 974. The Benavidez court questioned
giving grandparents preference absent statutory authority because, in reality, other relatives may
have closer ties to the child. Id. at 975. Furthermore, relatives' intervention could create delay and
red tape in the adoption process leaving prospective parents and social agencies with a choice between
going ahead with the adoption and facing relatives' intervention halfway through the process or
attempting to get waivers from close relatives of the child. Id.
63. 102 N.M. at 470, 697 P.2d at 153. See supra note 15.
64. Id.
65. Implicitly, had the grandparent assumed the status of in loco parentis, such status may have
provided a sufficient foundation for permissive intervention. See supra note 43.
66. 102 N.M. at 470, 690 P.2d at 153.
67. Id. See also Shorty, 87 N.M. at 490, 535 P.2d at 1347. See supra notes 43, 65.
68. 102 N.M. at 472, 697 P.2d at 155.
69. See supra note 62.
70. See infra note 71; Note, Grandparents Versus the State: A Constitutional Right to Custody,
13 Hofstra L. Rev. 375 (1977).
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would broaden grandparents' rights upon their grandchildren. 7' Courts
have recognized the value of the grandparent-grandchild relationship.72
To end this meaningful relationship because the parents' parental rights
have been terminated denies the grandparent and the child the opportunity,
when appropriate, to maintain familial ties.73 In some instances, the child's
best interests will require cutting off his ties with the consanguineous
family;74 in other circumstances, the child's best interests will be best
71. Several cases from other jurisdictions recognize the need for such a change. In In re Fox,
567 P.2d 985 (Okl. 1977), the court held that grandparents may adopt their grandchild under
appropriate circumstances, after appropriate legal consent, and pursuant to a proper court hearing
and court orders. Although "appropriate" was not defined, the court could apply the term to grand-
parents narrowly, thus following the loco parentis exception, or broadly, construing the best interests
of the child doctrine to favor grandparents.
In Wilson v. Family Serv. Div., 554 P.2d 227 (Utah 1976), the court articulated the policies which
must be balanced when considering grandparental involvement in adoption proceedings. The court's
objectives in custody decisions are to utilize practical procedures to facilitate placement and, in
facilitating placement, to relieve the public of expense and responsibility. The state stands in the
role of parent with commensurate duties and responsibilities for the child. It is desirable to achieve
the above stated objectives while recognizing the natural love and affection within families, the need
to encourage and preserve family unity, and the stability essential to the good order of society.
. If the court looked to the child's grandparents first in the adoption proceeding, the adoption
procedure would be quickened. The identity of the child's extended family could be readily deter-
mined, and, if placement within the extended family followed, society could be relieved of long
term foster care expenses.
In Muggenborg v. Kessler, 630 P.2d 1276 (Oki. 1981), the court recognized standing in a grand-
parent, although not a natural guardian, to claim custody of his offspring when both parents are
dead or their parental rights have been terminated. The maternal grandparent obtained custody of
the grandchildren and the paternal grandparents obtained a perogative writ to prohibit the enforcement
of the adoption decree. The recognition of such a right by the court of appeals in Wiley's case would
have permitted her to be heard in the adoption proceeding of her grandson.
Perhaps the most compelling case favoring the maintenance of ties with the consanguineous family
is In re Adoption of Anthony, 113 Misc. 2d 26, 448 N.Y.S.2d 377 (Fam. Ct. 1982). In Adoption
ofAnthony, Anthony was permitted to maintain an ongoing relationship with his blood siblings. The
concept permitting contact with his blood relatives is called "open adoption" and is permitted when
the best interests of the child require this alternative. Had this alternative been applied in Christian
Placement Service, Wiley would not have been given custody, but she would have been permitted
to maintain a relationship with her grandson. Since Wiley's grandson was an infant who had never
established a relationship with his grandmother, it is unlikely that the court would permit an ongoing
relationship to encumber the "adopting" family. The best interests of the infant would be seen as
demanding the severance of all ties.
In contrast, Adoption of Anthony involved the adoption of an older child. Its holding recognizes
significant social changes have occurred in our society which no longer demand severing old ties.
The secrecy, so imperative in earlier days when a heavy stigma was attached to illegitimacy, is no
longer vital. Fewer babies are given up for adoption because of declining birth rates, abortion, and
changing societal attitudes. More older children, who know of their past are being adopted. Psy-
chological and social research has revealed the importance of knowing one's ancestral, religious,
ethnic, and cultural background. In addition, congenital disease treatment demands knowledge of
the blood family's medical history.
72. See supra note 71.
73. See supra note 3.
74. For example, extra-familial placement is required where the child's safety may be endangered
by remaining with a family member.
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served by allowing visitation with grandparents or permitting the grand-
parents to adopt the grandchild.75
In the final analysis, Wiley's dilemma 76 may be most effectively al-
leviated through the legislative process. The legislature can permit grand-
parents a right to intervene in adoption proceedings by modifying the
Visitation by Grandparents Act. By granting grandparents a right to in-
tervene, the legislature will acknowledge the significance of the grand-
parent-grandchild relationship and will require the judge to determine
under what circumstances the child should be permitted to maintain fam-
ilial ties with a grandparent.
IV. CONCLUSION
The passage of the Visitation by Grandparents Act demonstrates a
recognition of emerging grandparental rights in New Mexico. Grandpar-
ents presently have a very limited statutory right to petition for visitation
rights pursuant to the Visitation by Grandparents Act and similarly limited
rights under specific circumstances pursuant to permissive intervention.
If the legislature modified the Visitation by Grandparents Act, the courts
could either provide a child access to the consanguineous family or permit
the grandparent to adopt the child when appropriate. Such a modification
will assure that the best interests of both the child and the family are
met.
CLAUDIA RAY
75. See supra note 71.
76. See supra notes 3, 13, 28, 32.
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